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vate investments, in the Russian regions? Except for the direct government investment in the economy of regions the 
government can influence the other agglomeration factors, capable to change an investment situation. The government 
can improve an investment climate in region, to generate positive expectations and to make region more attractive to the 
private investors. What levers is for that used? In the research we attempt to give the answers to these problems. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Both regional, and the federal government have a wide spectrum of measures capable to attract the 
investment in the economy of regions. Except for the direct investment in the economy of region, 
the government can to change an investment situation influencing on the agglomeration factors.  
The basic purpose is to investigate the impact of the regulating factors of regional policy on distri-
bution of investment over regions under spatial concentration of production in view of expectations 
of investors. 
For realization of the said object we have developed the econometric model pattern of joint dynam-
ics of expected profitability and investments, and have modified the theoretical agglomeration 
model for the analysis of spatial distribution of the capital. A role of an infrastructure, regional ex-
penditures on public account and expectations of the investors in attracting the investments are 
tested; the sentences in the field of forming policy of development of regions under concentration 
are developed.  
The agglomeration theory of new economic geography is the theoretical base for the analysis. The 
following hypotheses were checked: whether interregional economic and investment policy of gov-
ernment does connected to using of the agglomeration mechanisms? What the agglomeration fac-
tors does affect on the spatial concentration process and forming of a favorable investment climate 
in region? 
The effects of benevolent regional government on structure of market equilibrium states have been 
analyzed within the framework of modification of the footloose capital model proposed by the au-
thor. In particular, it has been found that under decreasing of transport costs the boundary of inter-
nal equilibrium stability, as well as the boundaries of upper and lower overlapping, from which the 
core-periphery outcomes are accessible, are narrows. On the contrary, the development of infra-
structure in region extends boundaries of interior equilibrium stability and overlapping.  
The regional government must to attract the capital in region for deriving the rent. The appeal of 
region to the investor will depend on magnitude of external economies, which is defined by 1) ex-
ternal economies originating from development of an infrastructure in region and 2) rate of the rent, 
which the regional government appropriates, diminishing thereby income on the capital. The re-
gional government interested in deriving of the income, will not only try to increase the rental rate, 
but also to attract the capital for job in region through development of infrastructure and magnifica-
tion of external economies on the capital. The mentioned about infrastructure is both industrial, and 
social, which ensures increase of external economies. Under weakly developed infrastructure even 
the benevolent government cannot keep the capital. If the region is highly advanced also magnitude 
of exterior economies rather high, at average or even at high magnitude of the regional rent rate the 
concentration of production and investment in region is possible under non-benevolence govern-
ment. The uniform distribution of investment over regions is possible at average level of infrastruc-
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ture development under condition that non-benevolent regional government, and, hence the rate of 
the rent, does not exceed some critical value. 
The hypotheses, which we have checked in the econometric part, concerned the impact of expected 
yield on arrangement of investment over regions of Russian Federation; effects of territorial con-
centration of production; the industrial and social infrastructure providing exterior economies; the 
role of government in development of regions and other.  
The author has offered the econometric model founded on estimation of investment in region de-
pending on expected yield and the agglomeration factors. The model reflects joint dynamics of in-
vestment and expected yield. The models of total investment and investment of a different pattern 
of ownership (state, municipal, private and mixed), investment in a fixed capital of organizations 
including the foreign capital and investment in branch of the economy (industry; transport; agricul-
ture; construction; connection; trade, public catering and wholesale by production of technological 
assigning; education and public health services) are estimated. The model is tested on the Russian 
data. The econometric estimation of the model has allowed to investigate the effects of federal and 
regional governments policy on volumes of attracted investment in regions of Russia. It is found 
that the agglomeration factors and the processes of concentration essentially influence spatial struc-
ture of investment in Russian Federation. Therefore, they are necessary for taking into account un-
der formation of interregional socio-economic and investment policy. The significant instruments of 
influence of government on spatial investment structure are detected. So the forming of home mar-
ket and development of investment and social infrastructure promotes a growth return on invest-
ment and external economies. So, it was found that conducting interregional investment policy and 
using accessible instruments, the state could influence growth of investment appeal and inflow of 
the investments in regions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Political context of study  
Both regional, and the federal governments have a wide spectrum of measures, capable to attract the 
investments in the economy of regions. Among of the accessible tools there are both direct, and in-
direct measures inducing investment. Besides government can realize investment itself. Promoting 
development of the Russian regions, it attracts the additional investment and, first of all, capital of 
private investors. Except for the direct investment in the economy of region, the government can 
use the agglomeration factors to change an investment situation.  
The investigations of agglomeration process in the Russian Federation display that the process of 
concentration and expectation of owners of production factors essentially influence the location 
(Лапо, 2004б, в; 2005). The specificity of process of spatial concentration in the Russian Federa-
tion is those, that the leading role in this process belongs to moving of capital, while the owners of 
the capital, as well as working population, remain immobile (Лапо, 2003). The theoretical analysis 
of the agglomeration process displays that the government, improving an investment climate in re-
gion, can create the positive expectations, make region more attractive to the private investors 
(Лапо 2004б, 2005).  
1.2. Statement of the research problem 
The theoretical base of analysis is the agglomeration theory of new economic geography (NEG). 
Among the basic advantages of spatial concentration of production it are considered, as a rule: ex-
ternal economies, growth of the intra-regional markets, the agglomeration effects. The appearance 
of agglomerations is connected with the advantage of infrastructure development, with the higher 
level of the public goods allotment, with higher living standards.  
The government can attract the investment in regions, using mechanisms of agglomeration and pro-
duction concentration, developing infrastructure, transportation network, conditions promoting to 
growth of the economy, forming positive expectations concerning yield on investment located in 
region and growth of production concentration. In that studies the influence of economic and in-
vestment policy of the federal and regional governments on processes of spatial concentration of 
production in Russia is tested. The hypothesis, which has been verified, is whether the interregional 
economic and investment policy of government connected to using of agglomeration tools? Which 
the agglomeration factor affect process of spatial concentration and form the favorable investment 
climate in region?  
The future of the Russian economy in many respects depends on the tendencies of spatial concen-
tration, which have developed during transformation. Agglomeration gives the rent to the partici-
pants of production, which retains the factors on the territory of region (Baldwin, Krugman, 2002). 
If the spatial concentration of production has taken place, and its advantages were already exhibited, 
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then effort on modification of territorial disproportions and attempts to help to depressive and un-
derdeveloped regions can be rather expensive or ineffective Therefore, measures on adjusting terri-
torial structure of the economy necessary to realize already now. The perspective interregional eco-
nomic and investment policy should be developed with accounting for agglomeration process. 
1.3. Objectives of the study  
The basic purpose is to investigate influence of the factors of regional regulating policy on spatial 
distribution of investment over regions under spatial concentration of production.  
The author has proposed the econometric model and modification of the agglomeration theoretical 
model in order to analyze the spatial distribution of investment in frameworks of the agglomeration 
approach. The role of infrastructure, regional budgetary expenditures and the investor's expectations 
in regional investment policy are tested; the sentences in the field of regional development policy 
under concentration are developed. 
2. THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF RESEARCH 
2.1. Review of literature 
There are a lot of papers devoted to the problem of industrial agglomeration: Krugman (1991a, b, c), 
Matsuyama (1991), Venables (1996), Fujita, Krugman, Venables (1998), Krugman, Venables 
(1995, 1996), Puga (1998), Martin, Ottaviano (1996, 1998), Baldwin (1998), Baldwin et al. 
(2003), Markusen, Venables (1997) etc. The most closed to the Russian reality is the scheme of 
capital relocation between regions offered in (Martin, Rodgers, 1995). In the model the labour is 
spatially immobile as well as owners of the capital. Capital is only mobile. The post-tax capital 
income is repatriated from regions and spent on markets of the other regions. Therefore the owner 
accepts the solution about the location of the capital basing on comparison of the nominal post-
tax income. 
Unlike the Martin–Rodgers model, in the model of Lapo (Лапо, 2004а, 2005) the inter- and intra-
regional trade costs are equal. In jobs of Lapo (Лапо, 2004а, 2005) the analyses is extended by the 
expense of research of infrastructure, which ensures external economies in region. The factor of in-
frastructure essentially influences a system of equilibrium outcomes and changes a picture of possi-
ble equilibrium state in a long-term solution.  
The impact of expectations is investigated in (Krugman, 1991b, c), (Matsuyama, 1991), (Baldwin, 
1999). It was proved that under certain conditions the expectations could create self-fulfilling ag-
glomeration process and lead the economy to a new local equilibrium. 
Concerning a role of expectations of economic agents in agglomeration processes, it is necessary to 
say the following. Still Marshall has shown that the resources move in a direction been determined 
by gap in current return. The speed of resources moving is defined by costs of relocation. If not only 
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current profitability is significant, but also the expected one, then it is connected to solutions of 
other individuals about location, and to their expectations of the future return. If the expectations of 
different individuals coincide, there is a new sort of externalities and, therefore, at least a potentially 
exists a possibility of self-fulfilling expectations.  
The expectation influence has been accounted under development of the agglomeration model. Ex-
amining a role of benevolent government in forming of spatial structure of investment in country, 
we have attempted to determine by econometrics, which tools are used by the federal and the re-
gional government to engage the investment in regions. One of problems is to find, whether the 
government creates a condition for converging positive expectations of majority of investors con-
cerning the economy of regions. The methodology of expectations research in the greater degree 
have based on the approach offered by the author and described in (Лапо, 2004б). 
2.2. Theoretical model 
Description of the model. The footloose-capital model (FC-model) of Martin and Rodgers (1995), 
and Baldwin et al. (2003) and its modification proposed by author and described in Lapo (2004a, 
2005) have been used as basis of development of the model. Let's expose the last modification 
briefly.  
In contrary to Martin and Rodgers (1995), which studied a problem of infrastructure influence 
through the transport costs and their differentiation in intra-regional and interregional trade, the fol-
lowing basic modifications proposed in (Lapo 2004а, 2005) are realized: the transport costs are 
identical both at intra-regional and at interregional transportation; the external economies arise not 
in transporting, but in production of goods; the external economies influence not the transport costs, 
but the return on the capital; the appearance of external economies is connected to development of 
public infrastructure in region.  
Capital is considered in the model as the mobile production factor. For the goods of monopolistic 
competition the transport costs of transition between regions are specified. The advantages of infra-
structure development, such as the external economies and growth of return on capital, are received 
by its owners, which immobile. 
The modeling of infrastructure and its influence on profitability of invested capital is the new mo-
ment in the model. The basic outcomes demonstrate the analysis of agglomeration effects as inter-
action of transport costs and external economies originating from the infrastructure.  
The model includes two regions: east (region 1) and western (region 2); two factors of production 
— labor L and capital K, which volume in country is limited; two sectors — industrial producing 
the goods with increasing return M, and sector with a constant return producing the public goods Z. 
The infrastructure is a public good. A labor is mobile between sectors, but immobile over regions. 
The capital is unique spatially mobile factor of production, while the owners of the capital remain 
immobile. However income on the capital is repatriated in regions, where the residents — owners 
of the capital live.  
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The regions in the model are symmetric respectively tastes and production technologies. The indus-
try is a sector of monopolistic competition of Dixit–Stiglitz type. The industrial sector made the 
goods, which can be sold in the markets of both regions, the transport costs are assumed of iceberg 
type. 
All tax incomes are putted in regions. The infrastructure gives the public benefit and is a free re-
source for owners of capital, thereby it increases return on capital and is a source of external 
economies. The investors of industrial sector consider the public good as the given magnitude, 
which is not depending on their will and solutions. The technology in industry is presented by the 
following function, ensuring increasing return to scale: 
 ( ) ( )j L M j j j j L M jF w a x f K f z w a xπ π+ = + ,       1, 2j = ,  (2.1) 
where aM is an amount of labour units per unit of the output, it is equal for both regions, f (K) is the 
required volume of the capital, f(z) is the function, which determines the size of external economies, 
j — index of region. We normalize the level of infrastructure development in region 2 (West), let 
( )2 1f z ≡  then ( ) ( ) ( )1 2/f z f z f z=  is the relative level of infrastructure development in East, πj 
is the rate of income on the capital; Lw  is rate of wages; jx  is volume of issue of manufactured 
goods (variations), jx  defines a size of firm under condition that one firm produces one type of 
goods. Including ( )f z  in function (2.1) means that the capital obtains advantages of external 
economies from development of infrastructure in region, therefore the real return rate to the capital 
with account of infrastructure development in region is equal: ( )1 1f zπ π= , 2 2π π= . 
The share of variations produced in East is equal to ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 2nd K f z K f z K= + , and in West is 
( )( )2 1 21 nd K K f z K− = + . The share of the capital determines the spatial structure of industrial 
production therefore basic our attention is directed on problems of the spatial arrangement of the 
capital. 
The following suggestions of model are concern of public goods production. The public good Z 
makes with a constant return, the Za  units of labour are required to produce one unit of infrastruc-
ture: Z L ZZ a w x= , here Lw  is rate of wages. The public good can be removed between regions with-
out costs. The state put the orders in region with the minimum costs, therefore the rate of wages levels 
between regions and sectors/, and is identical to both regions. Due to this the rate of wages in indus-
trial sector also is equal Lw . 
The migration condition of the mobile factor is 
 ( )( )1 2 1k k kd d dπ π= − −? ,  (2.2) 
it means that the capital follow to the best nominal rate of the return, kd  is the share of the capital 
employed in East. 
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The parameters of infrastructure development are external for the investors and do not depend on 
them. Consequently distribution of capital over regions is equilibrium of Nash.  
Criterion function of a customer. The representative customer in each region has preferences given 
by function 
 j jU C= ,        
( )1 1 1
1 1
0
n
j i
i
C c di
σ
σ
−
−
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ,       j = 1, 2,  (2.3) 
where jc  is the consumption of a manufactured goods composition; n is number or mass of manu-
factured goods accessible in the market; σ is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two 
goods. The indirect utility function has a form 
 jj
E
V
P
= ;        
( )1 1
1
0
n
i
i
P p di
σ
σ
−
−
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ ,       j = 1, 2,  (2.4) 
where jE  is expenditures in region j; P is "perfect" regional price index; ip  is price of an industrial 
variation i for a customer. Let ( )1 1a σ= −  and  
1
0
n
j i
i
p diσ−
=
⎛ ⎞∆ = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ , 
then, 
 aj jP = ∆ ,        j = 1, 2. (2.5) 
As the assumption about monopolistic competition of Dixit–Stiglitz type presumes a free and con-
tinuous entrance on the market, the net profit cuts up to zero. Therefore E  includes only corrected 
incomes on the factors. Besides the monopolistic competition of Dixit–Stiglitz type result in the 
producer's prices are optimum for industrial firms, so ratio of the goods prices of East in their local 
and export markets ip  is equal τ: 2 1p p τ= . Similarly is for West. At last, according to the Dixit–
Stiglitz conception a competition of infinite number of atomistic competitors has a place, the pro-
ducer's prices in equilibrium do not depend on a type of a competition (under Cournot or Bertrand) 
and are equal over regions. Hence, the consumer costs in the local and export markets of east re-
gion, accordingly, are equal  
 1 1 1
l Mw ap σ= −     and    2 1 1
l Mw ap τ σ= − .  (2.6) 
And similarly is for the local and export markets of West. Using demand function and producer's 
price the income on the capital in shot-run equilibrium can be expressed as 
 ( )1 1 EbB f znπ = ;     2 2
EbB
n
π = ,  (2.7) 
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where  
 1b σ= ;    1
1 2
1E Ed dB φ −= +∆ ∆ ;    2 1 2
1E Ed dB φ −= +∆ ∆ ; 
 ( )1 1n nd dφ∆ = + − ;    ( )2 1n nd dφ∆ = + − ; 
Ed  and 1 Ed−  is shares of the eastern and western regions in expenditures; 1∆  and 2∆  is denomina-
tor of demand function for East and West accordingly; σφ τ −= is parameter describing the transport 
costs; 0 1φ≤ ≤ ; then lower φ , then more the transport costs. 
The share of industry depends on share of capital working in region and infrastructure, therefore 
share of eastern nd  and western (1 nd− ) regions are possible to define as  
 ( )( ) ( )1kn k k
d f z
d
d f z d
= + −     and    ( ) ( )
1(1 )
1
k
n
k k
dd
d f z d
−− = + − ,  (2.8) 
accordingly, and then the expressions for 1∆  and 2∆  takes a form  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )1
1
1
k k
k k
d f z d
d f z d
φ+ −∆ = + −     and    
( ) ( )
( ) ( )2
1
1
k k
k k
d f z d
d f z d
φ + −∆ = + − .  (2.9) 
The share of the post-tax incomes in east region will be 
 ( )1L kEd d b bs= − + ,  (2.10) 
where 1Ld L L=  is a share of employed in east region, sk is a share of capital owned to the resi-
dents of east zone. 
The capital is mobile in a long-term equilibrium. The equation (2.2) is a formal condition for stabil-
ity of equilibrium state. It is visible, there are possible two types of long-term equilibrium in a sys-
tem: 1) internal, when capital takes identical return in regions ( 1π and 2π  are given through (2.8)): 
 1 2π π= , when 0 1kd< < ;  (2.11) 
2) core-periphery outcome, when 0kd =  or 1kd = . 
The condition (2.11) allows to find the closed form of solution for kd : 
 ( )( )Ek
d A
d
f z
φ φ
φ
+ −= − ,     where     
( )
( )1
f z
A
f z
φ
φ
−= − . (2.12) 
The admissible boundaries of parameters values are 0 1φ≤ ≤  and ( )0 f z≤ . Boundaries, in which 
the internal long-term equilibrium is stable, are ( ) 1f zφ φ< < ; they determine sectors marked as 6, 
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2, 3 and 5 in a Fig. 1. If ( )f z φ≤  (area 1), the internal equilibrium is unstable, and core displaced 
on West. If ( ) 1f z φ≥  (area 4), the internal equilibrium is unstable, core displaced on East. 
  f ( z )   
                      4 f(z)= φ
                5
       3  
1   
       2  
           6 
                 1  f(z)= 1/φ
 
0                       1 φ
 
Fig. 1. The diagram with overlapping, symmetric case 
In the model with the identical regional markets a break passes on curves  
 ( )f z φ=    and   ( ) 1f z φ= .  
If  
 ( ) ( )21 2f z φ φ> + ,  
then the outcome with the core in East will be stable. The curve  
 ( ) ( )21 2f z φ φ= +   
is same analog of a singular point. However, as against to Martin and Rodgers model, here we have 
not a point, but the curve. The comparison displays, that  
 ( )21 2φ φ+  < 1 φ ,  
and consequently there is a range of values of parameters (area 5), in which there are bifurcations of 
system and from which any of two stable equilibrium outcomes are accessible: internal and core-
periphery with the core in East. It is area of overlapping 
Similarly the equilibrium with the core in West is becomes stable, when  
( ) ( )22 1f z φ φ< + . 
Therefore, there is a second overlapping (area 6), in which two outcomes: the internal equilibrium 
and the stable concentration of the capital in West are accessible. Under 1φ = any equilibrium is 
stable. 
If to split the territory of the Russian Federation on two parts: west and east, and to include the Far 
East, Siberian, and Ural Federal districts in the East part, then for the Russian economy 1/ 3Ed = . 
Under conservation of the stability conditions of internal equilibrium the boundary of a stability of 
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the core-periphery outcome are displaced. The upper bound with the stable core in East passes 
along a curve ( ) ( )22 3f z φ φ= + , and with the core in West do ( ) ( )23 1 2f z φ φ= + . We see, that 
the boundaries are displaced upwards of rather symmetric case (Fig. 2).  
  f ( z )   
  
                  5
  
1   
  
           6
   
  
0                        1 φ
 
Fig. 2. The diagram with overlapping, asymmetric case  
The obtained outcome concerning the form of overlapping and long-term dynamics principally dis-
tinguishes the considered model from the Martin and Rodgers model, and from the other agglom-
eration models. 
Analysis of government benevolence influence on structure of market equilibrium states. We 
shall turn to a problem of regional government benevolence. We shall consider, how the intents of 
regional government, concerning collecting of the regional rent from the capital working in region, 
influence structure of equilibriums in model. 
We shall assume that the benevolence government works in the west region; it does not collect the 
regional rent from capital. We review in more detail the government of east region, which can be both 
benevolence and non-benevolence. We determine the f(z) as 
 f(z) = (1 – δ) z,  (2.13) 
where δ is rate of rent from the capital income, which collect the east regional government, z is rela-
tive level of infrastructure development providing external economies in east region. The size of 
external economies, and consequently magnitude of the real income on the capital will be defined 
not only development of infrastructure in region, but also by the benevolence of regional govern-
ment. At δ = 1 we have non-benevolent government (Leviathan), which accepts the all income on 
the capital. The magnitude δ = 0 means benevolent regional government. Intermediate government 
we have at 0 < δ < 1. 
In long-term equilibrium a solution will be still defined by condition (2.2), where 1 1(1 )zπ π δ= − , 
2 2π π= . The boundaries of stable equilibrium outcomes will depend on magnitude of external 
economies that is from a relation between benevolence of regional government and development of 
infrastructure in region. For dE = 1/2 the conditions ( )f z φ> , and ( ) 1f z φ<  delimiting stabilities 
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of an internal equilibrium, give: 
 ( ) ( )
1
1 1
zφδ φ δ< <− − . (2.14) 
From the inequality ( ) ( )21 2f z φ φ> +  follows the condition, under which the outcome with core 
in East will be stable: 
 ( )
21
2 1
z φφ δ
+> − . (2.15) 
The equilibrium with the core in West is similar becomes stable under ( ) ( )22 1f z φ φ< +  that is 
when: 
 ( )( )2
2
1 1
z φφ δ< + − . (2.16) 
At dE =1/3 two last conditions (2.15) and (2.16) have the following form: 
 ( )
22
3 1
z φφ δ
+> − , (2.17) 
 ( )( )2
3
1 2 1
z φφ δ< + −  (2.18) 
accordingly. 
The diagram demonstrating a general type of boundaries defining stability of equilibrium outcomes 
(2.14)–(2.18) is pictured in Fig. 3. 
z  
   0                                        1 δ
 
Fig. 3. Boundaries of equilibrium states of the economy 
Thick solid lines figure curves delimiting stability of internal equilibrium (2.14). A long dotted line 
plotted boundary of stability of solution with the core in East in (2.15) at dE = 1/2 or in (2.17) at 
dE = 1/3 accordingly. Boundary in (2.16) at dE = 1/2 or in (2.18) at dE = 1/3 defining stability of 
core in West is figured by points.  
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
15
The required magnitude of infrastructure development at some values of benevolence of regional 
government and transport costs providing stability of equilibrium states of the economy are shown 
in Appendix A1, Table A1.1–A1.6. From the data in tables we see, that under decreasing in trans-
port costs both the boundaries of internal stabile equilibrium and the boundaries of the upper and 
lower overlap constrict. 
To obtain the rent it is necessary for regional government to attract the capital, which stays and 
works in region. The appeal of region to the investor depends on magnitude of external economies 
f(z), which is defined by two factors: 1) by external economies originating from development of in-
frastructure in region and 2) rate of the rent, which the regional government collect diminishing 
thereby the income on the capital. The regional government interested in deriving of the income 
will not only try to increase the rental rate, but also to attract the capital for job in region through 
development of infrastructure and magnification of external economies on the capital. Under poorly 
developed infrastructure even the benevolent government cannot keep the capital in region. If re-
gion is highly advanced, and magnitude of external economies is rather high, than at average or 
even at high magnitude δ the concentration of production and investment in region is possible under 
non-benevolent government. At the average level of infrastructure development it is possible uni-
form distribution of investments over regions under condition that non-benevolence of regional 
government, and consequently rate of the rent, does not exceed some critical value. Thus, both be-
nevolent, and non- benevolent government are interested in regional infrastructure development and 
forming external economies to the capital. The question is about any infrastructure, both industrial, 
and social, which ensures appearance of external economies. 
3. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL SPECIFICATION  
AND THE ESTIMATION RESULTS 
3.1. Model specification 
We shall consider dynamics of investment depending on expected yield. In its turn, a value of ex-
pected profitability in regions also depends on a line of regional characteristics. The offered econo-
metric model forms a recursive set of equations and includes the equations for investment and ex-
pected profitability. The system describes two jointly related variables: Iit is investment in region i 
in year t, and eitπ  is the expected magnitude of profitability. Besides, there is autocorrelation of the 
first order for investment and profitability dependent variables will be taken into account in the 
model. 
The expectations concerning profitability of investment in the current year depend on profitability 
obtained in preceding year and other current regional characteristics. Under rational expectations 
depending on the information at the moment t 
 E[ eitπ  – (α10 + α11πit–1 + α1X1it–1 + µ1i + γ1t )|ℑt]=0, (3.1) 
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where πit–1 is magnitude of profitability in preceding year; X1it–1 are the regional characteristics, 
which have been taken into account in the model; µ1i is a regional specific fixed effects; γ1t is time-
specific effects; α10, α11 are unknown parameters; α1 is a vector of unknown parameters, i is index 
of region, i = 1, …, N; t is index of year, t = 3, …, T. From the taken preposition the expected prof-
itability equation can be written as  
 eitπ  = α10 + α11πit–1 + α1X1it –1+ µ1i + γ1t + ν1it, (3.2) 
where ν1it — stochastic disturbances, ν1it ∼ IID(0, 21σ ) and do not depend on a predicted error of 
expected profitability and random disturbance of investment.  
The investment equation depending on the expected profitability and lagged investment takes a 
form 
 Iit = β20 + β21 eitπ  + β22 Iit – 1 + β2 X2it –1+ µ2i + γ2t + ν2it, (3.3) 
where ν2it — stochastic disturbances, ν2it ∼ IID(0, 22σ ) and do not depend on a predicted error and 
random disturbance of expected profitability; β20, β21, β22 — are unknown parameters; β2 is a vector 
of unknown parameters; X2it–1 are the current regional characteristics accounted in the model, which 
influence investment location in region; µ2i — unobservable regional specific effects; γ2t — time-
specific effects.  
Profitability πit obtained in current year t, is equal 
 πit = eitπ  + eit, (3.4) 
where eit is the prediction error of profitability, which has the conditional mean equals zero under 
rational expectations conditioned by the information ℑt at the moment t  
 E(eit|ℑt) = 0, 
and the constant variance 2eσ . Expected profitability at the moment t does not depend on prediction 
error eit, and, besides, does not depends on ν1it and ν2it. Expressing the expected profitability eitπ  
through observable πit  
 eitπ  = πit – eit, (3.5) 
and substituting it in the equation (3.2) and (3.3), we obtain  
 πit = α10 + α11πit–1 + α1X1it –1+ µ1i + γ1t + ε1it, (3.6) 
where  
 ε1it = ν1it + eit, (3.7) 
 E(ε1it |ℑt) = 0,    var(ε1it |ℑt) = 21σ  + 2eσ ,    i = 1, …, N,    t = 3, …, T; (3.8) 
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and  
 Iit = β20 + β21πit + β22 Iit – 1 + β2 X2i t –1+ µ2i + ε2it, (3.9) 
 ε2it = ν2it – β21eit, (3.10) 
 E(ε2it |ℑt) = 0,    var(ε2it |ℑt) = 22σ  + 221β 2eσ ,    i = 1, …, N,    t = 3, …, T. (3.11) 
Under coincides of the macroeconomic expectations concerning of the different regions develop-
ment, taking into account that we consider rational expectation, the prediction errors in different 
regions are correlated with each other  
 cov(e1it, e1jt |ℑt) = σee,    i, j = 1, …, N,    t = 3, …, T, 
consequently 
 cov(ε1it, ε1jt |ℑt) = σee,    i ≠ j,    i, j = 1, …, N,    t = 3, …, T. (3.12) 
The disturbances of different regions in the investment regression correlate between each other  
 cov(ε2it, ε2jt |ℑt) = 221β σee,    i ≠ j,    i, j = 1, …, N,    t = 3, …, T. (3.13) 
However the errors relating to different time intervals do not correlate each other. 
As the disturbances of both equations of the system ε1it and ε2it depends on the prediction errors of 
profitability, so their covariance differs from zero 
 cov(ε1it, ε2it |ℑt) = –β21 2eσ ,     i = 1, …, N,     t = 3, …, T. (3.14) 
Besides, there is non-zero covariance of the different regions disturbances in the profitability and 
investment equations  
 cov(ε1it, ε2jt |ℑt) = –β21σee,    i ≠ j,    i, j = 1, …, N, t = 3, …, T. (3.15) 
The rest covariance is equal to zero. 
Taking into account the accepted hypotheses the covariance matrix of the system equations distur-
bances Ω have complex bloc structure  
 Ω = 11 12
21 22
Ω Ω⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟Ω Ω⎝ ⎠
, (3.16) 
where Ω11 and Ω22 are the covariance matrixes of disturbances of profitability and investment equa-
tions respectively, Ω12 and Ω21 — the covariance matrixes of disturbance of both equations. 
The blocks of a covariance matrix have the following form. The covariance matrix of the expected 
profitability equation disturbances is  
 Ω11=
i ij ij
ij i ij
ij ij i
G G G
G G G
G G G
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
?
?
? ? ? ?
?
, (3.17) 
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where 
 Gi = 
2 2
1
2 2
1
2 2
1
0 0
0 0
0 0
e
e
e
σ σ
σ σ
σ σ
⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
?
?
? ? ? ?
?
,       Gij = 
0 0
0 0
0 0
ee
ee
ee
σ
σ
σ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
?
?
? ? ? ?
?
. 
The covariance matrix of the investment equation disturbances takes a form 
 Ω22 = 
i ij ij
ij i ij
ij ij i
F F F
F F F
F F F
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
?
?
? ? ? ?
?
, (3.18) 
where 
 Fi = 
2 2 2
2 21
2 2 2
2 21
2 2 2
2 21
0 0
0 0
0 0
e
e
e
σ β σ
σ β σ
σ β σ
⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟+⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
?
?
? ? ? ?
?
 
and 
 Fij = 
2
21
2
21
2
21
0 0
0 0
0 0
ee
ee
ee
β σ
β σ
β σ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
?
?
? ? ? ?
?
. 
The disturbances covariance matrixes of the expected profitability and investment equations Ω12 
and Ω21 are symmetric, and besides they are symmetric respective to mine diagonal, therefore  
 Ω12 = Ω21 = 
i ij ij
ij i ij
ij ij i
H H H
H H H
H H H
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
?
?
? ? ? ?
?
, (3.19) 
there 
 Hi = 
2
21
2
21
2
21
0 0
0 0
0 0
e
e
e
β σ
β σ
β σ
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
?
?
? ? ? ?
?
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and 
 Hij = 
21
21
21
0 0
0 0
0 0
ee
ee
ee
β σ
β σ
β σ
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
?
?
? ? ? ?
?
. 
The problems of model estimator are discussed in Appendix A2. 
3.2. Variables, hypothesis and information 
We evaluate, what variables affect the acceptance of investment solutions in regions. The list of all 
variables can be found in Appendix A3. 
At the first stage the regression of gross investment (variable inv) on the investment factors was es-
timates. The basic attention was given to that explaining variable, which the state can control.  
On the following analysis stage the estimation of the investment equations of different ownership 
pattern have been conducted: state (inv_gos), municipal (inv_mun), private (inv_priv) and mixed 
(inv_mix). Besides the equation of the foreign investment (inv_foring) is estimated. 
The influence of variables defining location of the state and municipal investment in regions was 
analyzed. The estimation of regressions has allowed to establish characteristics of regions, which 
the state takes into account at acceptance of investment solution. The particular features of problem 
regions, which the state investment policy are aimed to correct, and same indexes of investment 
climate, what government aims to improve, were detected. The special attention in the system of 
equations for the state investments is given to investment in a social sphere, which provides devel-
opment of a social infrastructure and quality of the human capital.  
Under estimation of mixed investment we check the hypothesis about whether the factors vary at 
acceptance of investment solutions of private business, if private business participates in the in-
vestment projects jointly with the state. 
The third analysis stage have proposed estimation of system of regression equations for investment 
in different branches of the economy: inv_prom in industry; inv_tran in transport; inv_agri in agri-
culture; inv_build in building; inv_conn in connection; inv_trad in trade; inv_edu in education; 
inv_heal in public health services. Among enumerated sectors there are branches, in which the pri-
vate business is advanced mainly, and there are branches, where the public sector predominates. 
Therefore comparative analysis of the estimation outcomes for branchs equations systems also has 
significant means for the purposes of analysis. All indexes of investment were evaluated in terms of 
money and were cleared of inflation. It is necessary to mark, that GMM as the method of estimation 
allows to decide a problem of heteroscedasticity, therefore necessity of a normalization or taking 
the logarithm of the investment variable did not arise. 
The variables of the lagged investment in the appropriate equations reflect the tendencies of concen-
tration of investment in regions. In agglomeration models two types of dynamics are investigated: 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
20
monotone and cyclical. Under monotone dynamics the historical tendencies of concentration are 
saved, and the expectations of yield on investment are connected to regions, where the concentra-
tion already has place. In case of cyclical dynamics the expectations connected to change the region 
of investment location can be generated. Therefore, the positive sign of estimates of lagged invest-
ment means conservation of the historically usual tendencies in spatial structure of investment and 
conservation of expectations concerning profitability of investment in regions.  
The negative sign at the lagged variable of investment demonstrates change of the historical tenden-
cies of investment location, and as a corollary, modification of investment expectations concerning 
profitability of investment in regions. 
The expected profitability of investment is approximated by a variable of profitability assets (re-
turn). The significance of variable return in the equation of investment demonstrates impact of 
expected yield on acceptance of investment solutions, not specifying, whether the historical ten-
dencies in the arrangement of investment have saved or varied. It is necessary to underline, that in 
the agglomeration models the expected rate of income to capital is the basic criterion of the capi-
tal migration. It levers due to migration of capital and is identical to all enterprises of region. 
Therefore, the variable of expected profitability of assets (return) in the econometric model is 
uniform for all systems of equations. In system of equations we vary only second jointly depend-
ent variable appropriate to investment of different pattern of ownership or different branches of 
the economy.  
The influence of agglomeration processes is fixed by the following variables. The internal regional 
market consolidates both retail turnover, and turnover intra- and inter-branch of trade. Accordingly 
two variables are used to exposit the influence of the market: a retail turnover on soul of the popula-
tion (exp_peo), and number of enterprises and organizations registered in the region (plants). The 
index of retail turnover reflects impact of the retail trade market. 
The number of enterprises operating in region plays in agglomeration models one of basic roles and 
is, for example, the alternative to the working capital. That variable reflects a degree of concentra-
tion in region. Therefore, we used it as a variable approximating influence of concentration of en-
terprises in the econometric model. At once this variable allows to approximate effect of the market 
connected with intra- and inter-branch turnover of goods.  
Variables reflecting effect of external economies in region are connected to development of in-
frastructure (Лапо, 2004а, б; 2005). Among infrastructure variables we used an amount of room 
telephones (telephone). The connection is most dynamically developed branch forming infra-
structure. The development power-engineering branch is necessary for operation of a line of in-
dustries in region, therefore variable of the electric power production in regions also have been 
included in the regression equations. The variable stu_emp reflects dynamics of a social infra-
structure intended for training of personnel and shaping human capital in region. The variable 
stu_emp is defined as the ratio of students of higher school education to the employed popula-
tion. The variable t_price is an index of the transport tariffs; it is oriented to take into account 
influence of transport costs.  
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Among explaining variables defining policy of government the index of budgetary security of re-
gions (bud_peo) are considered; it is calculated as the ratio of expenditures on public account of the 
Russian Federation subjects to population.  
Besides, the singularities of branch structure were controlled in the regression equations. From the 
point of view of investment activity in region it was important to inspect influence of branches con-
nected to oil extracting. Therefore, the variable of specific weight of a fuel industry (fuel) has been 
included in the regression. The share of chemical and petrochemical industry (chemical) is supple-
mented also. Influence of macroeconomic shocks connected with denomination, default and rise in 
prices on petroleum were taken into account by fixed annual effects of 1997, 1998 and 2002. 
We tested the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1. The expected yield is the essential factor for the location of investment over regions.  
Hypothesis 2. The process of production concentration in regions strongly affect on location of in-
vestment.  
Hypothesis 3. The infrastructure development in region ensures external economies and by that at-
tracts the additional investment. 
Hypothesis 4. The growth of home market attracts the new investment in regions. 
Hypothesis 5. A high skill level of employed population (quality of the human capital) attracts the 
investment on territory of region. 
Hypothesis 6. The regional government maintaining development of a social infrastructure and 
growth of the human capital on territory of region promotes inflow of investment.  
Hypothesis 7. Increasing budgetary security of region the government reduces regional risks and 
raises the investment appeal of territory. 
Hypothesis 8. Participating in the joint investment projects the government of a different level (fed-
eral, regional and municipal) reduces regional risks of investors and ensures inflow of investment in 
region.  
Hypothesis 9. The transport costs are the essential factor in the arrangement of investment. How-
ever, depending on a degree of production concentration and depending on level of costs, their in-
fluence is exhibited differently: the transport costs can promote both process concentration of in-
vestment in regions, and process of dispersion of production over territory of country, therefore es-
timates of parameters can have both positive, and negative sign. 
The empirical analysis has based on sample enveloping all regions of Russia and metropolis Mos-
cow and St.-Petersburg (total 79 regions). The Chechnya republic is considered together with In-
gushetiya. The autonomous territories are jointed in a composition of regions and areas. The ob-
servable horizon for the total investment envelops 1992–2003 years, for the state and private in-
vestments is 1993–2003, for investments in branches of the economy is 1994–2003. The repre-
sented information is a panel data. The basic recourse of information is statistical collection "Re-
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gions of Russia" for 1996–2004 years issued by Goscomstat. All data are reduced in a comparable 
form. The price deflators eliminated effects of inflation. 
3.3. Outcomes of estimation  
The total investment in regions of the Russian Federation. The outcomes of estimation are pre-
sented in Appendix A4, Table A4.1.  
At the beginning we shall stay on the equation of assets profitability. The unstable state of the econ-
omy in transition period has found reflecting in oscillations of yield of assets in regions, therefore 
the negative sign of parameter estimate of lagged magnitude of yield (–0.1757) testifies. Among 
explaining variables the positive influence to yield render the infrastructure variables: development 
in region of electric power industry (4.0741), parameter is significant at a level 1%. The ratio num-
ber of students to the employed population equals to 95.6419 and expresses the influence of a social in-
frastructure.  
By results of estimation the negative effects of expenditures on public account to 1 inhabitant of 
region and number of enterprises on expected profitability of assets is detected. The first outcome 
can be stipulated by budgetary policy correcting non-uniformity of regional development of territo-
ries of Russia. The second established fact probably is connected to singularities of account on pri-
vate enterprises, which are concentrated in economically developed regions, where, it is possible, 
the accounted indexes of profitability are underestimated a little. 
The significant positive estimates of variable of electric power development prove essential influ-
ence of industrial infrastructure on the expected yield of assets.  
There is an ambiguous interpretation of outcomes concerning influence of variable describing a 
variation of the transport costs. One of the explanations can probably consist in the following. The 
positive influence of the transport costs growth rates on expected yield and on the investment in the 
appropriate equations can be one of regularities of the agglomeration processes. It is proved by the 
agglomeration model that the magnification of the transport costs conducts to amplification of non-
uniformity of regional development, appearance of agglomerations, and forming of core-periphery 
structure of the economy. 
By results of analysis of correlation matrixes in the regression equation of expected yield the minor 
correlation of residuals with some explaining variables is found: with t_price (–0.4922), plants 
(0.1909), and energy (–0.2585). The correlation has given us the foundation to estimate this system 
using instead of variable in the first differences t_price, plants, energy their lagged value in levels: 
dt_price, dplants, denergy for construction of GMM-instruments. However the parameters esti-
mates in system in the second variant differ only un-significantly. Therefore, the second variant of 
regression we not demonstrate. The signs of coefficients have not varied, as the significance level 
has not varied also. It is necessary to make conclusion that the first variant of regression and using 
of variables t_price, plants, and energy in the first differences for construction of GMM-instruments 
are acceptable.  
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Certainly, the basic interest for the analysis has the equation of investment. Particularly, the positive 
estimate (0.2554) for the lagged variable of investment is significant at 1% level and testifies to an 
amplification of process of investment concentration in regions for analyzable period. It is found 
that the investors largely react to expected yield of assets; the parameter estimate of expected yield 
is equal to 0.0052 at one-percentage significance level. It is necessary to state that arrangement of 
total investment over regions of the Russian Federation follows to a direction of expected yield un-
der conservation of the usual tendencies of spatial concentration of investment. The following hy-
potheses implying from the agglomeration model have found the confirmation: the growth of in-
vestment concentration conducts to their further concentration, and also hypothesis that investment 
moves in a direction of expected yield. The determined positive response on expected yield allows 
to conclude that expectation of investors in Russia influence on the territorial structure of invest-
ment. 
The effect of the market connected to a retail turnover was estimated by variable ехр_рео. The es-
timation is equal –0.4680; the sign of parameter estimate is negative. The negative influence of the 
inhabitant's expenditures in region to the total investment can have, apparently, some reasons. 
1. The fact of negative influence of the population expenditures on investment in region is con-
nected to the theoretically justified and investigated dilemma between the savings and consumption 
of population. The growth of consumption in Russia in analyzable phase has leaded in a drop of 
saving and investment at the expense of resources of population. 
2. Decrease of the real incomes of population. Variable exp_peo reflects real population expendi-
tures on soul in region.  
Therefore, the market effect founded in the agglomeration model and connected to growth of in-
come of population, which theoretically should conduct to an amplification of concentration proc-
esses in region, has not found confirmation in econometrics.  
The market effect been attribute for the agglomeration model in the Russian Federation apparently 
is connected to growth of intra- and inter-branch trade between enterprises of region.  
Features of spatial investment concentration under different patterns of ownership. The fac-
tors influencing on spatial arrangement of state, municipal, private, mixed and foreign investments 
were estimated (Table A4.2). First of all, we shall mark outcomes obtained in the equations of ex-
pected yield of assets. The significant correlation of expected yield with the lagged actual indexes 
of yield is found. The influence of the lagged value of yield on expected one reaches 0.0507 and is 
significant on 1% level in the system of equations for state pattern of ownership. In the system of 
equations for other patterns of ownership the following estimates of factors are obtained: 0.0302 in 
the equation for the municipal property (factor is significant at 5%), 0.0303 and 0.0337 accordingly 
for the private and mixed pattern of ownership, the significance of two last factors is fixed at 5 and 
1%. Indicated factor is equal 0.0275 in the system of equations for the foreign investment. Thus, the 
separation of investment by patterns of ownership has allowed to establish positive significant ef-
fects, which in the analysis of the gross investment were not found. In particularly, the presence of 
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positive expectations concerning yield of assets in the Russian economy, which is determined by 
the reached level of yield, is established. 
All equations of profitability demonstrate negative correlation with expenses of retail turnover on 1 
inhabitant of region; the significance level of estimates of parameters reaches 1–5%. The estab-
lished fact, in common, contradicts theoretical conception, however it can be quite explained a) by 
discrepancies in yield of the large and average enterprises and b) by singularities of accounting. The 
enterprises working in an sphere of the wholesale flows of intra- and inter-branch trade, on the one 
hand, ensure higher yield, and, on the other hand, the accounting in the large companies is organ-
ized much more exact than in sphere of a retail turnover in small organizations catering the popula-
tion. In this light the sign of estimates quite can achieve negative values or demonstrate lack of con-
nection with yield.  
The quality of human capital has positive correlation with yield of assets in system of equations of 
state and municipal investments. Thus, the policy of government directed on development of the 
human capital, can indirectly influence the attraction of investment in regions through magnifica-
tion of their yield and growth of appeal of regions for investment. 
After separation of investment by patterns of ownership the effects of expected yield become more 
explicit and precise. The level of budgetary security essentially influences the expected yield in sys-
tem of equations of the state, municipal and private investment: 5.3047, 5.8174, and 4.2278 accord-
ingly; the parameters are significant at 5–10%. We see, that the budgetary security of region is sig-
nificant factor for engaging of investment and its effect is determined through the growth of ex-
pected yield. The development of social infrastructure influences on expected yield significantly in 
the system of equations for state and municipal patterns of ownership.  
There was the variable of share of fuel industry, which significantly effects, in all equations of ex-
pected yield; factor varies from 0.2447 up to 0.2508 and is significant at 5%. 
Let's return to the equations of investment and consider, what factors affect magnitude of state, mu-
nicipal, mixed, private and foreign investment in regions.  
So the positive correlation with the lagged investment is found in the equations of the state, munici-
pal and private investment. All enumerated estimates of parameters are significant at 1% level. 
They get the highest values in equations for municipal (0.3248) and private investment (0.3063). 
While in the equation of the state investment the estimate is equal to 0.0821. For the mixed invest-
ment such feature is not determined.  
Thus, both private, and government investor continue to invest in those regions, where before real-
ized the investment; in the most part of regions the historical tendencies of investment location are 
saved. This tendency is stronger exhibited for the municipal investment: the estimate of parameter 
for the lagged municipal investment more than twice exceeds a similar estimate for the state in-
vestment. The founded outcome demonstrates that participation of municipal administration in in-
vestment process in regions more intensively than federal. The municipal territories conduct long-
term investment policy.  
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The positive sign of variable of lagged private investment in the appropriate regression equation 
confirms the hypothesis about amplification of spatial concentration of investment. The obtained 
estimate testifies to a dominance of positive investment expectations concerning regions, where the 
investment located earlier. There are the external economies and the agglomeration rent is formed 
with growth of production concentration in regions. The positive expectations concerning yield on 
investment in regions in proceeding phases confirms growth of actual yield of assets and hereinafter 
attract the new investment in region. Thus, we have discovered confirmation to cyclical process of 
concentration growth of investment in regions by econometrics.  
The common effect of expected yield on investment are estimated by variable yield on assets (re-
turn). So the estimate of the yield effect is equal 0.0092 in the equation of the state investment and 
is significant at 1%. For the municipal investment the appropriate coefficient reaches 0.0006. 
The outcomes of estimation demonstrate the following. The inflow of the state investment posi-
tively answers on growth of expected yield on investment. In common case investors benefit from 
engaging of the state investment, as the average yield on assets in region will increase.  
The comparison of the coefficients estimates of yield influence in the equations of the state and mu-
nicipal investments allows to make an inference that the state investments in the greater degree than 
municipal react to growth of yield. One of the basic reasons, as it seems, is that the state investment 
are more oriented on a realization of the large infrastructure projects, what largely ensure formation 
of external economies and fast growth of yield on assets.  
The municipal investment is aimed in the greater degree at realization of socially significant pro-
jects, which ensures return through growth of quality of the human capital not at once, and much 
later. The private business does not undertake realization of such project, but they are necessary for 
development of territory. In the total sum the municipal investment also allow to increase appeal of 
region to the private investors. 
Coefficient reflecting effects of expected yield on magnitude of the mixed investment attracted in 
region in the regression equation of the mixed investment equal 0.0039. Thus, the mixed investment 
is oriented on expected yield. A role of federal and regional government in the joint project is to 
correct migration of private investment to a direction of less attractive regions. In this case the state 
participation in the mixed investment projects allows to increase attraction of private investment in 
regions by decreasing regional investment hazards.  
Coming back to the equation of private investment, we see, that effect of expected yield on private 
investment is not significant. The apparent inconsistency with the theoretical postulates of the ag-
glomeration models is explained, how we think, by following. On state, municipal, and also joint 
enterprises the book keeping conducts much stricter, it is not aimed at concealment of the profit. On 
private enterprises the launder schemes of money withdrawal are applied more often. Therefore, in 
the equations of the state, municipal and mixed investments the appropriate significant factors are 
found. In the greater degree the distortions of accountability take place at the enterprises of the pri-
vate pattern of ownership. That is why there is an imaginary picture that the private investors are 
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not oriented on profit. However private investors are interested to obtain the profit and they are 
guided in making decision by expected yield of investment. This phenomenon has found evidence 
in the regression equation of the private investment through estimate of the lagged investment coef-
ficient. The effect of the last private investment is significant at a level 1% and equal 0.3063. Pro-
ceeding from the hypotheses that the lagged investment reflects expectations of private investors 
concerning yield under conservation of historical tendencies in distribution of investment, it is pos-
sible to make conclusion, that the private investment follows to expected yield, and the historical 
tendencies of spatial concentration predominate in spatial distribution of private investment. 
Let's consider effects of other variables. 
The budgetary security of region introduced through a variable bud_peo, significantly influences on 
state (0.1597), municipal (0.0341), and mixed (0.1626) investment. The growth of budgetary secu-
rity, on the one hand, augments the investment possibilities of regions, and, with the other hand, it 
serves as the factor of growth of investment appeal of territory in the investment projects. The effect 
magnitude of variable "budgetary security of territory" in engaging the mixed investment is 
stronger, than its influence on the exclusive state or municipal investment. At the same time the 
budgetary security influence the distribution of private investment through growth of expected yield 
in region.  
The growth of infrastructure development in region measured through growth of telephones num-
bers positively influence engaging of the private (1.8418) and foreign (0.7159) investment, and it 
allows to decrease the fix costs for private business by the joint exploitation of infrastructure and 
formation of external economies. The other variable of infrastructure development connected with 
energy in region is significant in equation of state (0.0092) and mixed (0.0237) investment. The ad-
vantages of the human capital are emerging to the Russian business only indirect through growth of 
expected yield. And, apparently, it did not become determinative under taken a solution about direc-
tion and location of investment yet.  
The insignificant estimates of coefficients of the infrastructure variable in the equations of state and 
municipal investments and negative one in the equations of the mixed investment demonstrate a 
role of the state in regulating process of spatial concentration. The state investment directs to re-
gions less provided with an infrastructure to promote their development hereafter. 
The same conclusion should be made concerning influence of the transport costs. The state and mu-
nicipal investments locates in regions with the high transport costs. The appropriate significant co-
efficients are equal to 0.0166 for the state investment, and 0.0059 for municipal. The obtained esti-
mates prove that central and local governments direct investment to regions with the higher trans-
port costs; state takes this function in the greater degree.  
Analyzing the obtained equations, we see, both the federal and regional governments incur the sup-
port function to develop regions, which are less attractive for investor, with the high transport costs 
and less developed infrastructure. Thereby the government promotes development of region, growth 
of its home market, infrastructure, which forms favorable investment climate for the private invest-
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ment, the government decrease investment hazards of the private investors participating in the in-
vestment projects.  
The effects of enterprises number (variable plants) on the private and foreign investments in regions 
are quite expected and coordinated with theoretical position of the agglomeration theory. Estimates 
of parameters are equal 0.0049 and 0.0046 accordingly and are significant at 1%. Obtained coeffi-
cients demonstrate direct influence of the agglomeration effects on the private and foreign invest-
ments. 
The number of the enterprises been registered in region significantly influences volume of munici-
pal investment. The estimate of parameter is equal 0.0003, and, as it seems, demonstrates the fol-
lowing regularity. When more enterprises enter into agglomeration, then budgetary possibilities of 
regional jurisdictions are wider for a realization of investment.  
The investment in branches of the economy. The outcomes of the equations systems estimation 
are shown in Table A4.3 in Appendix A4. 
As well as in systems of equations for investment of different pattern of ownership, in systems of 
equations for investment in branch of the economy the expected yield on assets is essentially posi-
tively influenced by budgetary security of regions, and the share of branches of a fuel industry, and 
it is negatively influenced by the expenditures of a retail turnover on one inhabitant. At the same 
time there are differences. The effect of lagged indexes of yield has a negative sign.  
The analysis of the investment equations has shown the following. 
The industry is the sector of the economy, in which privatization basically is completed. Conse-
quently regularities of the spatial arrangement of investment in industry are defined mainly by mar-
ket factors. In the equation of investment in industry the following significant variables are found. 
The last year's indexes of investment essentially influence volume of investment in industry of re-
gions; the estimate equal 0.1027, and is significant at a level 1%.  
The positive effects of the lagged investment are established in the other branches of the economy 
for investment in agriculture (0.0525) and connection (0.1363). It is possible to make inference that 
the process of spatial concentration of investment in industry, agriculture, and connection amplifies; 
the expectations determined by the historical tendencies of concentration play the essential role. 
The expected profitability of assets positively influences investment in transport branch and educa-
tion. Factors are equal 0.0163 and 0.0009 accordingly. Thus, the hypothesis about interrelation of 
expected profitability and decisions of investors on location of investment over regions of the Russian 
Federation have found confirmation.  
The most part of branches of the economy, among which are transport (0.0054), building (0.0019), 
connection (0.0021), trade (0.0018), education (0.0002) demonstrate a strong direct correlation be-
tween investment in the regional economy and number of enterprises registered on its territory. The 
coefficients are significant at a level 1–5%. The founded correlation allows to make conclusion that 
the investors tend to invest in regions with higher concentration of enterprises, which guarantees the 
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large home market and high external economies. The infrastructure variables influence the spatial 
arrangement of investment in some branches of the economy. For example, the electric power gen-
eration in region essentially influences engaging of investment in agriculture (0.0010). The devel-
opment of social infrastructure is the factor attracting investment in agriculture and education. 
Let's analyze in more details equations for branches, where the position of the federation and mu-
nicipalities are strong. To such branches it is necessary to refer education and public health services, 
which, behind some elimination, are on state financing; an agriculture, which receives state support 
from the budgets of a different level (for example, credits for fuel-lubricant materials); the building, 
where exist building permit. In these branches (except for education) the negative response of in-
vestors on expected yield is detected. So, the estimates of parameters of expected yield on assets in 
construction, agriculture and public health services are equal accordingly –0.0040, –0.0003 and  
–0.0014 and are significant at a level 1–5%. The following values of coefficients of the lagged invest-
ment influence in construction and public health services are obtained: –0.6680 and –0.2921 accord-
ingly, the estimates also are significant at a level 1%.  
Thus, the governing role of government with the purpose to correct investment streams in the enu-
merated branches is enough precisely traced. The investment direct to regions less attractive to pri-
vate investors, therefore in the econometric analysis we have negative estimates of parameters. 
Thereby, we see, that the government is interested in development not only perspective regions, but 
also in development of regions, which economy requires support at the present moment. The pur-
pose of government spends correcting interregional investment policy is a solution of problems of 
socio economic development of regions, forming of investment appeal of territories, creating of a 
favorable investment climate.  
In this connection it is necessary to mark the other significant correlations, which have been deter-
mined in the equations of investment in agriculture and education. The quality of the human capital of 
region significantly influences investment in agriculture, the estimate of parameter equals 0.0861 and 
is significant at a level 5%. The competent and qualified population of region ensures higher yield and 
can attract more investment in branch. Other essential factor for investment in agriculture is the budg-
etary security of region, which estimate is equal 0.0122. Both estimates are significant at a level 5%.  
As to education, the quality of human capital, and number of enterprises registered in region con-
tribute in growth of investment in the regional system of education. All estimates of parameters for 
the enumerated variables are significant and positive. At the same time the state compensates a 
shortage of infrastructure in regions, promoting development of system of education. So we see, 
that coefficient at variable of infrastructure is significant at a level 1 % and is negative (–0.1634). 
Let's see once again, how the state investment in regions correlated with the investment in socially 
significant branches of the economy (Table A4.4). We have additionally estimated the systems of 
equations for the state investment, in which we had included the variable of investment in such 
branches of economy as education, public health services as explanatory variables in investment 
equations. Investment in construction was controlled.  
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The parameters estimates of investment in education and public health services in the equations 2, 3 
and 4 in Table A4.4 are significant and positive. The investment in education gives estimate 1.5327, 
which is significant at a level 1%. The investment in public health services influences at a level of 
0.7751 under significance 5%. The estimate of investment in building is not significant. Thereby we 
have found evidence of social directedness of public expenditures oriented on development of so-
cial infrastructure in the field of education and public health services of regions.  
The comparison of estimation outcomes of systems of equations 2–4 for state investment with the 
first variant, in which the investment in branches of the economy were not taken into account, dis-
plays the following. The parameters estimates of common explanatory variables (lagged state in-
vestment, expected yield, budgetary security of regions, generation of electric power, influence of 
transport rates) practically not vary and remain significant. Hence, it is possible to conclude that the 
obtained outcomes are stable.  
Thus, it is established by results of estimation that the governments of different levels (federal, re-
gional and local) positively affect development of regions eliminating the failures of market. Under 
growth of production concentration in separate regions and intensive formation of spatial agglom-
eration, which are precisely exhibited in regularities of the spatial location of commercial branches, 
such support is necessary. Let's remark, that such branches, as education and public health services, 
are one of the key factors in formation of the human capital; they define the future scientific and 
technical development of regions and country as a whole, form a social infrastructure of regions. In 
particularly, the government support expresses in that, what the state attracts investment in regions, 
which are less favorable for the private investors, in regions, where the expected yield of assets is 
lower then required, where the streams of investment are unstable, where the amenity provision is 
inadequate, where the concentration of enterprises is less and accordingly magnitude of external 
economies is lower. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The modification of the theoretical agglomeration model, which is taking into account external 
economies on the capital from development of infrastructure in region and the rent to regional gov-
ernment, is developed in research. The rental rate allows to take into account a degree of govern-
ment benevolence. The necessary operations of government (both benevolence and non-
benevolence) on development of infrastructure and on forming of external economies in order to 
attract the investment in region are analyzed in the model.  
In that research we offer the econometric model, which estimates the investment in region depend-
ing on expected yield and on the agglomeration factors. The model of total investment, investment 
of different pattern of ownership (state, municipal, private and mixed), investment in a fixed capital 
of organizations including the foreign capital and investment in branch of the economy (industry; 
transport; agriculture; construction; connection; trade, public catering and wholesale by production 
of technological assigning; education and public health services) are estimated. The models are tes-
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tified on the Russian data. The estimation of the models has allowed to investigate influence of pol-
icy of the federal and regional governments on volumes of investment attracted in regions of Rus-
sia. It was evidenced that the agglomeration factors and the process of concentration essentially in-
fluence spatial structure of investment in the Russian Federation. Consequently, those factors are 
necessary taken into account under formation of the inter-regional socio-economic and investment 
policy. The significant instruments of influencing on spatial structure of investment by government 
were determined by results of estimation. The formation of a home market and development of the 
investment and social infrastructure promote appearing of increasing return on investment and ex-
ternal economies. It was found, that the policy of government directed on location of investment in 
regions including the regions less developed and less attractive for private investment. Making in-
terregional investment policy and using accessible instruments, the state promotes growth of in-
vestment appeal and migration of investment in regions. 
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APPENDICES 
A1. Relation between values of infrastructure development parameters in region and 
benevolence of regional government delimiting the boundaries of steady states in the economy 
Table A1.1. Necessary level of infrastructure development depending on benevolence of regional government at the 
high transport costs, dE = 1/2, φ = 0.2 
δ Boundary of internal equilibrium stability  
Boundary of stability of core  
in East  
Boundary of stability of core  
in West  
0 0.2 5 2.6 0.3846 
0.1 0.2222 5.5555 2.8889 0.427 
0.2 0.25 6.25 3.25 0.4807 
0.3 0.2857 7.1428 3.7143 0.5494 
0.4 0.3333 8.3333 4.3333 0.6410 
0.5 0.4 10 5.2 0.7692 
0.6 0.5 12.5 6.5 0.9615 
0.7 0.6667 16.6667 8.6667 1.2820 
0.8 1 25 13 1.9230 
0.9 2 50 26 3.8461 
Table A1.2. Necessary level of infrastructure development depending on benevolence of regional government at the 
high transport costs, dE = 1/3, φ = 0.2 
δ Boundary of internal equilibrium stability  
Boundary of stability of core  
in East  
Boundary of stability of core  
in West  
0 0.2 5 3.4 0.5555 
0.1 0.2222 5.5555 3.7778 0.6173 
0.2 0.25 6.25 4.25 0.6944 
0.3 0.2857 7.1428 4.8571 0.7936 
0.4 0.3333 8.3333 5.6667 0.9259 
0.5 0.4 10 6.8 1.1111 
0.6 0.5 12.5 8.5 1.3889 
0.7 0.6667 16.667 11.333 1.8518 
0.8 1 25 17 2.7778 
0.9 2 50 34 5.5556 
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Table A1.3. Necessary level of infrastructure development depending on benevolence of regional government at the 
average transport costs, dE = 1/2, φ = 0.5 
δ Boundary of internal equilibrium stability  
Boundary of stability of core  
in East  
Boundary of stability of core  
in West  
0 0.5 2 1.25 0.8 
0.1 0.5556 2.2222 1.3889 0.8889 
0.2 0.625 2.5 1.5625 1 
0.3 0.7143 2.8571 1.7857 1.1428 
0.4 0.8333 3.3333 2.0833 1.3333 
0.5 1 4 2.5 1.6 
0.6 1.25 5 3.125 2 
0.7 1.6667 6.6667 4.1667 2.6667 
0.8 2.5 10 6.25 4 
0.9 5 20 12.5 8 
 
Table A1.4. Necessary level of infrastructure development depending on benevolence of regional government at the 
average transport costs, dE = 1/3, φ = 0.5 
δ Boundary of internal equilibrium stability  
Boundary of stability of core  
in East  
Boundary of stability of core  
in West  
0 0.5 2 1.5 1 
0.1 0.5556 2.2222 1.6667 1.1111 
0.2 0.625 2.5 1.875 1.25 
0.3 0.7143 2.8571 2.1428 1.4285 
0.4 0.8333 3.3333 2.5 1.6667 
0.5 1 4 3 2 
0.6 1.25 5 3.75 2.5 
0.7 1.6667 6.6667 5 3.3333 
0.8 2.5 10 7.5 5 
0.9 5 20 15 10 
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Table A1.5. Necessary level of infrastructure development depending on benevolence of regional government at the 
low transport costs, dE = 1/2, φ = 0.8 
δ Boundary of internal equilibrium stability  
Boundary of stability of core  
in East  
Boundary of stability of core  
in West  
0 0.8 1.25 1.025 0.9756 
0.1 0.8889 1.3889 1.1389 1.0840 
0.2 1 1.5625 1.2812 1.2195 
0.3 1.1428 1.7857 1.4643 1.3937 
0.4 1.3333 2.0833 1.7083 1.6260 
0.5 1.6 2.5 2.05 1.9512 
0.6 2 3.125 2.5625 2.4390 
0.7 2.6667 4.1667 3.4167 3.2520 
0.8 4 6.25 5.125 4.8780 
0.9 8 12.5 10.25 9.7561 
 
 
Table A1.6. Necessary level of infrastructure development depending on benevolence of regional government at the 
low transport costs, dE = 1/3, φ = 0.8 
δ Boundary of internal equilibrium stability  
Boundary of stability of core  
in East  
Boundary of stability of core  
in West  
0 0.8 1.25 1.1 1.0526 
0.1 0.8889 1.3889 1.2222 1.1696 
0.2 1 1.5625 1.375 1.3158 
0.3 1.1428 1.7857 1.5714 1.5037 
0.4 1.3333 2.0833 1.8333 1.7544 
0.5 1.6 2.5 2.2 2.10526 
0.6 2 3.125 2.75 2.6316 
0.7 2.6667 4.1667 3.6667 3.5087 
0.8 4 6.25 5.5 5.2633 
0.9 8 12.5 11 10.5263 
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A2. Description of estimator methodology of the econometric model  
Model (3.6)–(3.11) under condition of cov(ε) = Ω, where Ω is defined as (3.16)–(3.19) represents a 
recursive system of the simultaneous equations with the correlated errors. As the errors of the equa-
tions of system correlate among themselves, the joint estimator of the equations is necessary. In this 
case the step-by-step procedures, which usually apply to recursive systems, do not approach for es-
timator. Besides, whereas the equations of system are defined as a dynamic panel regression, the 
generalized method of least squares applied to a set of equations at the presence of covariance of 
disturbances does not approach for estimator. It is necessary to use the generalized method of mo-
ment.  
Introduce the notations. 
Y
I
π⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
?  is vector of observations of (2N(T – 2))×1 joining all simultaneously depended variables,  
π is the profitability observation vector, I is the investment observation vector. 
1
2
0
0
X
X
X
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
?? ?  is the bloc-diagonal matrix of (2N(T – 2))×(p1 + p2), combined the observations of 
right-hand-side explanatory variables in both equations of the system, 1X?  — the matrix of observa-
tions of explanatory variables for the equation of expected profitability, 2X?  — the observations ma-
trix of explanatory variables for the investment equation, p1 and p2 are the quantity of the estimating 
parameters in the first and in the second equations respectively. 
1
2
ββ β
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
?? ?  is vector united the parameters both equations of dimension (p1 + p2)×1, there 1β?  =  
= (α10, α11, T1α ) T , 2β?  = (β20, β21, β22, T2β ) T . The appropriated them vector of parameters estimates 
we denote as B? . 
1
2
E
E
E
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
?  — the combined vector of disturbances of profitability and investment equations of di-
mension (2N(T – 2))×1.  
Rewrite the system (3.6)–(3.11), (3.16) as 
 Y X Eβ= +?? ? ? , (A.1) 
 E( E? | ℑt) = 0, cov( E? | ℑt) = Ω. (A.2) 
The objects including in the sample cover all regions (regions, territories, republics) of Russia ex-
cepting Chechnya. The autonomous formations are taken into account in composition of territories. 
Thus the sampling regions can consider as population. It allows to specify the estimated regressions 
equations in the system as fixed effects regression. The model with the fixed effects takes into ac-
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count the specific features of each region. The years' fixed effects reflect influence of macroeco-
nomic shocks. 
The estimated equations are the dynamic panel regressions. The presence of the profitability predic-
tion error determines the correlation of disturbances and the correlation between errors and explana-
tory variables. The application of OLS and GLS gives inconsistent estimates (Verbeek, 2000; 
Baltagi, 1995). Therefore the generalized method of moments (GMM) in the first differences has 
been used for estimation. For proposed model specification it guarantee the effective parameters 
estimation at large Т (Blundell, Bond, Windmeijer, 2000). The first differences allow to remove un-
observable fixed effects µi. 
A line of instrumental variables for model in first differences is defined from orthogonal conditions 
of lagged values of variables and disturbances (Baltagi, 1995). Variables are instruments themselves 
for strictly exogenous explanatory variables, including the fixed effects. 
As the lagged values of depended variables Yis (investment and expected profitability) do not corre-
late with disturbances of equations in first differences, under the suppositions for system of equa-
tions, we take the lagged value of endogenous variables as instruments. Strictly exogenous explana-
tory variables Xis are the instruments for themselves. The GMM moment conditions for both equa-
tions of system can be written in the following form: 
 E(∆εkit Ykis ) = 0,    s = 2, …, t – 1;    t = 3, …, T, (A.3) 
k = 1 corresponds to expected profitability equation, k = 2 specifies the investment equation. We 
use the lagged value of investment and profitability as instruments for endogenous variables in the 
investment equation. Condition defining the instruments for expected yield in the equation of in-
vestment is possible to note as 
 E(∆ε2it πis ) = 0,    s = 2, …, t – 1;    t = 3, …, T. (A.4) 
The matrix of instruments has the bloc-diagonal form: 
 1
2
0
0
Z
Z
Z
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
?? ? . 
The number of the moment conditions exceeds the number of the estimated parameters; therefore 
the estimator of the generalized method of moments will be based on minimization of a quadratic 
form of corresponding sampling moments:  
 ( ) ( )T Tmin NB E Z W Z E∆ ∆? ? ? ? ? , (A.5) 
where WN is some weight matrix; TZ?  is a matrix of dimension m×2N(T – 2), m is the number of va-
lidity instruments. Then the GMM-estimates of parameters are  
 ( ) 1T T T TN NB X ZW Z X X ZW Z Y−= ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? , (A.6) 
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where WN is a matrix of weigh coefficients. The estimator of the covariance matrix of the parame-
ters estimates is equal (see. Baltagi, 1995) 
 ( ) 1T Tˆcov( ) NB X ZW Z X −= ∆ ∆? ? ? ? ? . (A.7) 
Taking into account the covariance of errors the GMM-estimation to be conducted in two stages. 
On the first step some initial weight matrixes WN can be selected, particularly it is possible to take 
the identity matrix as weight one: 
 WN = IN, 
that allows to obtain the optimum estimator of optNW . 
On the second step optNW  is determined as 
 ( ) 1opt TNW Z WZ −= ? ? , (A.8) 
where W is the estimate of covariance matrix, obtained on the first step; the dimension of W is equal 
to 2N(T – 2)×2N(T – 2). Definition IN as WN on the first step allows to computer W as the consistent 
estimate of the covariance matrix of errors. The estimation of elements of matrix W was conducted 
with use of regression residuals ∆ Eˆ?  obtained on the first step. 
The estimates obtained on the first stage are consistent for large N and finite T. Using optNW  on the 
second step allows to obtain estimates, which in the absence of the additional information are as-
ymptotically effective in the class of estimator founded on the linear moment conditions. 
The matrix optNW  corresponds to a general case of GMM and does not require IID or normal distri-
bution of disturbances vit or eit. It guarantees the asymptotically normal estimator of parameters. 
To test the validity of the moment conditions used in GMM, the Sargan-test of overidentifying re-
striction (Blundell, Bond, Windmeijer, 2000) was applied. For the model in first differences the test 
statistic is obtained as 
 ˆ ˆd NSar E ZW Z E
Τ Τ= ∆ ∆? ? ? ? , (A.9) 
where ∆ Eˆ?  are the two step residuals of regression; WN is the optimum weight matrix optNW .  
If the null hypothesis supposing validity of the moment conditions is correct, Sard is asymptotically 
2χ distributed with (m – p) degrees of freedom. 
The residuals of regression were tested on availability of autocorrelation by autocorrelation coeffi-
cients of the first and second order (rA(1) and rA(2)). Because the estimation was conducted in the 
first differences, the first order autocorrelation is admissible. 
The check of multicollinearity and endogenity of explaining variables was spent by coefficients of 
correlation of explaining variables among themselves and with residuals of the equations. These 
coefficients we do not show in the report, they would take too much places. However at once we 
shall note, that the correlation is not detected. 
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A3. List of variables 
Dependent variables  
return — the assets profitability of organizations in industry (in percentage);  
inv — investment in a fixed capital;  
inv_prom, inv_tran, inv_agri, inv_build, inv_conn, inv_trad, inv_edu, inv_heal — investment in 
industry; transport; agriculture; construction; connection; trade, public eating and wholesale by pro-
duction of technological assigning; education and public health services accordingly; 
inv_gos, inv_mun, inv_priv, inv_mix — state, municipal, private and mixed investment in the fixed 
capital accordingly;  
inv_foring — investment in a fixed capital of organizations including the foreign capital; 
Explanatory variable 
lreturn, linv, linv_prom, linv_tran, linv_agri, linv_build, linv_conn, linv_trad, linv_edu, linv_heal, 
linv_gos, linv_mun, linv_priv, linv_mix, linv_foring — the lagged value of the appropriate vari-
ables;  
exp_peo — ratio of retail turnover to population of region;  
bud_peo — budgetary security of region calculated as the ratio of budgetary expenditure of the 
Russian Federation subjects to a population;  
t_price — indexes of the tariffs on freight traffic;  
telephone — availability of room telephones of a common use web on 1000 persons of an urban 
population;  
stu_emp — ratio of number of the higher education students in regions of the Russian Federation to 
a volume of employment in the economy of region;  
plants — number of enterprises and organizations;  
energy — generation of electric power (billions kilowatt-hours);  
fuel, chemical — specific share of the fuel and chemical industry in the branch structure of industry 
of region; 
god97, god98, god02 — fixed annual effects 1997, 1998 and 2002 years accordingly. 
Instruments 
For endogenous variables the GMM-instruments were constructed on the basis of the following 
lagged values of variable in levels:  
dinv, dreturn, dinv_prom, dinv_tran, dinv_agri, dinv_build, dinv_conn, dinv_trad, dinv_heal, 
dinv_edu, dinv_gos, dinv_mun, dinv_priv, dinv_mix, dinv_fdi, dt_price, dplants, denergy. 
For construction of GMM-instruments of exogenous variables the variables themselves were ap-
plied. 
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A4. Outcomes of econometrics  
Table A4.1. The parameters estimates of the regression equations system for expected profitability and investment1) 
Explanatory variables Inv2) 
1 2 
Return 
lreturn –0.1757* 
exp_peo 12.1274 
bud_peo –21.7866* 
t_price 3.8903* 
telephone –88.2533 
stu_emp 95.6419*** 
plants –0.5780* 
fuel 0.4376 
energy 4.0741* 
chemical –0.1595 
Investment 
linv 0.2554* 
return 0.0052* 
exp_peo –0.4680*** 
bud_peo 0.1790 
stu_emp 0.6268 
telephone –1.3856 
t_price 0.0154*** 
plants 0.0004 
fuel 0.0023 
energy 0.0002 
chemical 0.0135 
 
p-level Sar 1 
rA(1) 0.0822* 
rA(2) 0.0338 
1) * — 1 %, ** — 5 %, *** — 10%. The estimates of the fixed regional and annual effects are not shown. The annual effects 1997, 
1998 and 2002 were valued.  
2) Instruments in the equation of expected profitability of assets are the following: dreturn, exp_peo, bud_peo, t_price, telephone, 
stu_emp, plants, fuel, energy, chemical, god07, god08, god02. Instruments in the equation of investment: dinv, dreturn, exp_peo, 
bud_peo, stu_emp, telephone, t_price, plants, fuel, energy, chemical, god07, god08, god02. 
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Table A4.2. The parameters estimates of the regression equations system for expected profitability and investment of 
different patterns of ownerships1) 
Explanatory 
variables Gos
 Mun Priv Mix Foring 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Return3) 
lreturn 0.0507* 0.0302** 0.0303** 0.0337* 0.0275** 
exp_peo –7.9491* –8.0790* –7.7730* –7.2789** –7.4572* 
bud_peo 5.3047*** 5.8174** 4.2278*** 4.0031 3.9743 
t_price 0.6445** 0.7201** 0.5880*** 0.5246*** 0.5214*** 
telephone –4.6912 –10.0002 –8.9391 –5.6179 –13.0337 
stu_emp 32.7555*** 33.2000*** 25.8199 26.5093 25.2144 
plants –0.0028 –0.0068 –0.0071 –0.0070 –0.0087 
fuel 0.2495** 0.2447** 0.2479** 0.2481** 0.2508** 
energy 0.1232 0.1227 0.0539 0.0837 0.0708 
chemical 0.1163 0.1188 0.1027 0.0987 0.1010 
Investment4) 
linv_j2) 0.0821* 0.3248* 0.3063* 0.0265 –0.1182** 
return 0.0092* 0.0006** 0.0007 0.0039*** –0.0015 
exp_peo –0.0171 0.0070 –0.1791 –0.2160** 0.0261 
bud_peo 0.1597* 0.0341* 0.0620 0.1626*** –0.0522 
stu_emp 0.2213 0.1151 0.0496 0.0225 0.0983 
telephone –0.5554 –0.0819 1.8418*** –1.4675*** 0.7159*** 
t_price 0.0166* 0.0059* –0.0123 0.0100 0.0036 
plants 0.0000 0.0003 0.0049* 0.0004 0.0046* 
fuel –0.0018 –0.0000 –0.0006 –0.0037 0.0004 
energy 0.0092*** –0.0002 –0.0071 0.0237** –0.0020 
chemical –0.0005 0.0009 –0.0080 0.0042 –0.0044 
 
p-level Sar 1 1 1 1 1 
rA(1) –0.2240* –0.1912* –0.1883* –0.1921* –0.1806* 
rA(2) –0.0720* –0.0824* –0.0878* –0.0895* –0.0931* 
1) * — 1 %, ** — 5 %, *** — 10%. The estimates of the fixed regional and annual effects are not shown. The annual effects 1997, 
1998 and 2002 were valued. 
2) The effect of lagged state (linv_gos), municipal (linv_mun), private (linv_priv), mixed (linv_mix) and foreign (linv_foring) invest-
ment accordingly was evaluated in the equations. 
3) Instruments: dreturn, exp_peo, bud_peo, t_price, telephone, stu_emp, plants, fuel, energy, chemical, god07, god08, god02.  
4) Instruments: dinv_gos, dinv_mun, dinv_priv, dinv_mix, dinv_foring in the appropriate equations of regressions, and also: dreturn, 
exp_peo, bud_peo, stu_emp, telephone, t_price, plants, fuel, energy, chemical, god07, god08, god02. 
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Table A4.3. The parameters estimates of the regression equations system for expected profitability and investments in 
branches of the economy1) 
Explanatory 
variables Prom
3) Tran3) Agri3) Build3) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Return 
lreturn –0.1397* –0.1178** –0.1476* –0.1297** 
exp_peo –4.8349** –4.9869** –4.8203** –4.8974** 
bud_peo 3.4791*** 3.3337*** 3.7501*** 3.4183*** 
t_price –0.1512 –0.1352 –0.0751 –0.1445 
telephone 2.4064 0.2097 6.3555 1.0496 
stu_emp 10.0298 9.4750 12.0989 9.9242 
plants 0.0008 0.0008 0.0004 0.0007 
fuel 0.2385* 0.2372* 0.2357* 0.2387* 
energy 0.0697 0.0612 0.0795 0.0675 
chemical –0.0541 –0.0537 –0.0509 –0.0522 
Investment 
linv_j2) 0.1027* –0.2086** 0.0525*** –0.6680* 
return –0.0019 0.0163* –0.0003** –0.0040* 
exp_peo –0.0589 0.1206 –0.0069 –0.0983** 
bud_peo 0.0715 0.0477 0.0122** 0.0248 
stu_emp 0.4790 –0.1316 0.0861** 0.1766 
telephone 0.7863 –0.1704 –0.0359 0.0472 
t_price 0.0057 –0.0074 0.0006 –0.0008 
plants –0.0001 0.0054* –0.0000 0.0019* 
fuel 0.0011 –0.0036 –0.0001 0.0013 
energy 0.0028 0.0156 0.0010*** –0.0001 
chemical 0.0005 0.0044 0.0000 –0.0023 
 
p-level Sar 1 1 1 1 
rA(1) –0.0666** –0.0807* –0.0614** –0.0733* 
rA(2) –0.1513* –0.1481* –0.1501* –0.1502* 
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Explanatory 
variables Conn
4) Trad4) Edu4) Heal4) 
1 2 3 4 6 
Return 
lreturn 0.1217** –0.1294* –0.1010*** –0.1415* 
exp_peo –5.1414* –4.8627** –4.8102** –4.8927** 
bud_peo 3.5672*** 3.5539*** 3.2814*** 3.5128*** 
t_price –0.0871 –0.1316 –0.1654 –0.1463 
telephone 2.7471 3.7917 2.7462 1.2936 
stu_emp 11.1700 10.9730 10.1244 10.0405 
plants 0.0010 0.0011 0.0016 0.0006 
fuel 0.2377* 0.2380* 0.2367* 0.2392* 
energy 0.0707 0.0741 0.0651 0.0707 
chemical –0.0500 –0.0544 –0.0528 –0.0542 
Investment 
linv_j2) 0.1363** –0.3849* –0.0112 –0.2921* 
return –0.0032* –0.0042* 0.0009* –0.0014* 
exp_peo –0.0323** –0.0321*** 0.0021 –0.0167 
bud_peo 0.0273*** 0.0261 0.0083 0.0188 
stu_emp 0.1369 –0.1458 0.4642* 0.1198 
telephone –0.0392 –0.0683 –0.1634*** 0.0779 
t_price 0.0005 0.011 0.0005 0.0009 
plants 0.0021* 0.0018* 0.0002** 0.0002 
fuel 0.0002 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 
energy 0.0000 –0.0007 –0.0001 –0.0003 
chemical 0.0005 0.0003 –0.0001 –0.0003 
 
p-level Sar 1 1 1 1 
rA(1) –0.0783* –0.0724* –0.0891* –0.0662** 
rA(2) –0.1470* –0.1488* –0.1455* –0.1519* 
1) * — 1 %, ** — 5 %, *** — 10%. The estimates of the fixed regional and annual effects are not shown. The annual effects 1997, 
1998 and 2002 were valued. 
2) The effect of lagged investment in industry (linv_prom), transport (linv_tran), agriculture (linv_agri), construction (linv_build), 
connection (linv_conn), trade (linv_trad), education (linv_edu), public health services (linv_heal) accordingly was evaluated in the 
appropriate equations.  
3) Instruments in the equation of expected profitability of assets: dreturn, exp_peo, bud_peo, t_price, telephone, stu_emp, plants, fuel, 
energy, chemical, god07, god08, god02. Instruments in the appropriate equation of investment: dinv_prom, dinv_tran, dinv_agri, 
dinv_dild,and also dreturn, exp_peo, bud_peo, stu_emp, telephone, t_price, plants, fuel, energy, chemical, god07, god08, god02.  
4) Instruments in the equation of expected profitability of assets: dreturn, exp_peo, bud_peo, t_price, telephone, stu_emp, plants, fuel, 
energy, chemical, god07, god08, dog02. Instruments in the appropriate equation of investment: dinv_conn, dinv_trade, dinv_edu, 
dinv_heal, and also dreturn, exp_peo, bud_peo, stu_emp, telephone, t_price, plants, fuel, energy, chemical, god07, god08, dog02. 
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Table A4.4. The parameters estimates of the regression equations system for expected profitability and state investment1) 
Explanatory 
variables Variant 1
 Variant 2 Variant 3 Variant 4 
1 2 3 4 5 
Return2) 
lreturn 0.0507* 0.0463* 0.0398* 0.0417* 
exp_peo –7.9491* –7.9042* –7.5652* –7.6345* 
bud_peo 5.3047*** 5.1105*** 4.4967*** 4.5746*** 
t_price 0.6445** 0.5871*** 0.5367*** 0.5338*** 
telephone –4.6912 –4.9417 –5.2614 –4.6941 
stu_emp 32.7555*** 30.8374*** 27.5663*** 27.8410*** 
plants –0.0028 –0.0028 –0.0047 –0.0039 
fuel 0.2495** 0.2499** 0.2462** 0.2466** 
energy 0.1232 0.1026 0.0766 0.07595 
chemical 0.1163 0.1109 0.0986 0.1009 
Investment3) 
linv_gos 0.0821* 0.0731* 0.0946* 0.0951* 
return 0.0092* 0.0113* 0.0067* 0.0075* 
inv_edu4) – 1.5926* 1.5316* 1.5327* 
inv_heal5) – – 0.7871** 0.7751** 
inv_bild6) – – – 0.0287 
exp_peo –0.0171 0.0084 0.0112 0.0140 
bud_peo 0.1597* 0.1488** 0.1548* 0.1585* 
stu_emp 0.2213 –0.3856 –0.2810 –0.2651 
telephone –0.5554 –0.3186 –0.5329 –0.5378 
t_price 0.0166* 0.0136** 0.0137** 0.0138** 
plants 0.0000 0.0001 –0.0000 –0.0000 
fuel –0.0018 –0.0028 –0.0019 –0.0021 
energy 0.0092*** 0.0095*** 0.0119*** 0.0122** 
chemical –0.0005 –0.0002 –0.0006 –0.0004 
 
p-level Sar 1 1 1 1 
rA(1) –0.2240* –0.2153* –0.2036* –0.2067* 
rA(2) –0.0720* –0.0775* –0.0846* –0.0833* 
1) * — 1 %, ** — 5 %, *** — 10%. The estimates of the fixed regional and annual effects are not shown. The annual effects 1997, 
1998 and 2002 were valued. 
2) Instruments: dreturn, exp_peo, bud_peo, t_price, telephone, stu_emp, plants, fuel, energy, chemical, god07, god08, god02. 
3) Instruments: dinv_gos, dreturn, exp_peo, bud_peo, stu_emp, telephone, t_price, plants, fuel, energy, chemical, god07, god08, 
god02. 
4) Additional instrument: dinv_edu. 
5) Additional instruments: dinv_edu, dinv_heal. 
6) Additional instruments: dinv_edu, dinv_heal, dinv_bild. 
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